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(57) ABSTRACT 
A method for identifying vulnerable system call pairs is dis-
closed. The method is based on a model for identifying Time-
Of-Check-To-Time-Of-U se (TOCTTOU) problem (called 
STEM), which enumerates the potential file system call pairs 
(called exploitable TOCTTOU pairs) that form the check/use 
steps. The system function calls are classified into a plurality 
of predefined classes and pairs of the function calls are 
formed according to predefined criteria, where the function 
calls within a pair are associated with the same file invariant. 
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Input: dentry d 
Output: 0- succeed, -1 - the binding of dis 
tainted. 
1 if d. refcnt = O 
2 then d.fsuid current user ID, record current pid 
and current time in d.gh_list, d.refcnt++, d.tainted 













if d.fsuid =current user id 
then record current pid and current time in 
d.gh_list, if d.tainted =false 
then return 0 
else return -1. 
else 
if current user ID = root 
then remove all invariants on d.gh_list, 
d.fsuid root, record current pid and current 
time in d.gh_list, d.refcnt 1, d.tainted false, 
return 0. 
else 
if d.fsuid =root 
then return 0. 
else 
if current user ID is the owner of d 
then remove all invariants on d.gh_list, 
d.fsuid current user ID, record current 
pid and current time in d.gh_list, 
d.refcnt1, d.tainted false, return 0. 
else return 0. 
FIG. 9 
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1 
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PREVENTING 
RACE CONDITION VULNERABILITY 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
1. Field of the Invention 
2 
In another embodiment there is provided a system for 
reducing vulnerability in a computer system by identifying 
vulnerable pairs of function calls. The system includes a 
classifying unit for classifying the function calls into a plu-
rality of predefined classes, and a generation unit for gener-
ating a plurality of pairs of the function calls according to a 
predefined criteria, wherein each pair of the function calls 
being associated with a file invariant. 
In yet another embodiment, there is provided an operating 
The present invention generally relates to security com-
puter system, and more specifically, relates to a system and 
method for preserving data integrity in a computer system. 
2. Description of the Related Art 10 system with reduced vulnerability. The operating system 
includes a library of plurality of function calls, a classifying 
unit for classifying the function calls into a plurality of pre-
defined classes, and a generation unit for generating a plural-
ity of pairs of the function calls according to a predefined 
TOCTTOU (Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use) is a well 
known security problem. An illustrative example is a Unix 
command, sendmail, which used to check for a specific 
attribute of a mailbox file (e.g., it is not a symbolic link) 
before appending new messages. However, the checking and 
appending operations do not form an atomic unit. Conse-
quently, if an attacker (the mailbox owner) is able to replace 
his mailbox file with a symbolic link to /etc/passwd between 
the checking and appending steps by sendmail, then he may 20 
trick sendmail into appending emails to /etc/passwd. As a 
result, an attack message consisting of a syntactically correct 
/etc/passwd entry with root access would give the attacker 
root access. TOCTTOU is a serious threat: In 11 of the 
reported cases on TOCTTOU vulnerabilities between 2000 25 
and 2004, the attacker was able to gain unauthorized root 
access. These cases cover a wide range of applications from 
system management tools ( e.g.,/bin/sh, shar, tripwire) to user 
level applications (e.g., gpm, Netscape™ browser). The 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities affect many operating systems, 
including: Conectiva™, Debian™, FreeBSD™, HP-UX™, 
Immunix™, MandrakeSoft™, RedHat™, Sun Solaris™, and 
SuSE™. TOCTTOU vulnerabilities are widespread and 
cause serious consequences. 
15 criteria, wherein each pair of the function calls being associ-
ated with a file invariant. 
The present system and methods are therefore advanta-
geous as they prevent race condition vulnerabilities. Other 
advantages and features of the present invention will become 
apparent after review of the hereinafter set forth Brief 
Description of the Drawings, Detailed Description of the 
Invention, and the Claims. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FIG. 1 depicts a state transition diagram for FS object f. 
FIG. 2 depicts an enhanced state transition diagram with 
two users. 
FIG. 3 illustrates a flowchart for a framework for TOCT-
30 TOU detection. 
The sendmail example shows the structural complexity of 35 
a TOCTTOU attack, which requires (unintended) shared 
access to a file by the attacker and the victim (the sendmail), 
plus the two distinct steps (check and use) in the victim. This 
complexity plus the non-deterministic nature ofTOCTTOU 
attacks make the detection difficult. For example, TOCTTOU 40 
attacks usually result in escalation of privileges, but no imme-
diately recognizable damage. Furthermore, successful tech-
niques for typical race condition detection such as static 
analysis are not directly applicable, since the attacker pro-
gram is not available beforehand. Finally, TOCTTOU attacks 45 
are inherently non-deterministic and not easily reproducible, 
making post mortem analysis also difficult. These difficulties 
are illustrated by the TOCTTOU vulnerabilities recently 
found in vi and emacs commands, which appear to have been 
in place since the time those venerable programs were ere- 50 
ated. 
FIG. 4 illustrates a window of vulnerability divided by total 
save time as a function of file size. 
FIG. 5 illustrates the vulnerability and save window sizes 
of vi. 
FIG. 6 illustrates an event analysis of the vi exploit. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the success rate of attacking vi on small 
files. 
FIG. 8 illustrates the success rate of attacking vi on large 
files. 
FIG. 9 illustrates an invariant holder tracking algorithm. 
FIG. 10 illustrates results from an exemplary implementa-
tion. 
FIG. 11 illustrates a process for classifying function calls. 
FIG. 12 illustrates a process for an operating system 
according to one embodiment of the invention. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
In this description, the term "application" as used herein is 
intended to encompass executable and nonexecutable soft-
ware files, raw data, aggregated data, patches, and other code 
segments. The term "exemplary" is meant only as an 
example, and does not indicate any preference for the 
embodiment or elements described. Further, like numerals 
Therefore, it is desirous to have an apparatus and method 
that prevent race condition vulnerabilities, and it is to such 
apparatus and method the present invention is primarily 
directed. 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
55 refer to like elements throughout the several views, and the 
articles "a" and "the" includes plural references, unless oth-
erwise specified in the description. 
Briefly described, a system and method of the invention 
reduce the vulnerability caused by race conditions in a com-
puter system. In one embodiment there is provided a method 
for reducing vulnerability in a computer system by identify-
ing vulnerable pairs of function calls. The method includes 
classifying the function calls into to a plurality of predefined 
classes, and generating a plurality of pairs of the function 
calls according to a predefined criteria, wherein each pair of 
the function calls being associated with a file invariant. 
In overview, the present system and method enables an 
operating system to detect and prevent TOCTTOU problems. 
60 First, a model is presented and then the system and method 
are developed based on this model. The model (called 
STEM-Stateful TOCTTOU Enumeration Model) captures 
potential vulnerabilities caused by TOCTTOU problems. The 
model is based on two mutually exclusive invariants: a file 
65 object either does not exist, or it exists and is mapped to a 
logical disk block. For each file object, one of these invariants 
must remain true between the check and use steps of every 
US 8,127,413 B2 
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program. Otherwise, potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities 
arise. This model allows enumeration of the file system call 
pairs of check and use (called exploitable TOCTTOU pairs), 
between which the invariants may be violated. From this 
model it is derived a protection mechanism, which maintains 5 
the invariants across all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs by 
preventing access from other concurrent processes/users. 
After classifying the file system calls, a systematic analysis 
for potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities can be performed. 
These analyses provide a quantitatively better understanding 10 
of TOCTTOU attacks. An event-driven defense mechanism 
(called EDGI) based on the STEM model can then be used for 
preventing exploitation of TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. The 
EDGI defense has several advantages over previously pro-
posed solutions. First, based on the STEM model, EDGI is a 15 
systematically developed defense mechanism with careful 
design (using event-condition-action ECA rules) and imple-
mentation and can stop TOCTTOU attacks. Second, with 
careful handling of issues such as inference of invariant 
scopes and time-outs, EDGI allows very few false positives. 20 
Third, it does not require changes to applications or file sys-
tem application program interface (API). Fourth, the imple-
mentation on Linux kernel and its experimental evaluation 
show that EDGI carries little additional overhead. 
25 
The Abstract File System 
Due to the complexity of the TOCTTOU problem in real 
file systems, a simplified Abstract File System (AbsFS) is 
developed and on which the TOCTTOU problem and design 30 
a defense mechanism is defined. The Abstract File System 
(AbsFS) manages a set of file system (FS) objects. Each file 
system object consists ofa pathname, an ordered set oflogical 
disk blocks, and a mapping of the pathname to the corre-
sponding set of logical disk blocks. For simplicity it is 35 
assumed the AbsFS to contain only contiguous files, i.e., the 
set of logical disk blocks is sequential for every file, and the 
AbsFS only needs to map the pathname to the address (block 
number) of the initial logical disk block. Let F denote the set 
of all pathnames and B denote the set of all logical disk 40 
blocks, the pathname mapping function resolve is defined by: 
resolve: F~BU{0},0cB 
Given a pathname f~F, iftheAbsFS object corresponding 
to f exists, with the initial logical disk block number b~B, 
then resolve(f)=b is defined. IftheAbsFS object correspond- 45 
ing to f does not exist, then resolve(f)=0, is defined. The 
AbsFS defines an Application Programming Interface con-
sisting of four operations on file objects: 
Definition 1: creation(pathname) is the operation that cre-
ates new FS objects in the AbsFS by changing the mapping 50 
for pathname f from resolve(f)=0 to resolve(f)=b, for some 
bEB. 
4 
normal use, removal, and check) are all the currently defined 
AbsFS operations. The creation and removal operations 
change the resolve mapping, while the check and normal use 
operations do not change the resolve mapping. The AbsFS 
operations and FS object states can be represented in a state 
transition diagram shown in FIG. 1. 
Since the TOCTTOU vulnerability happens with concur-
rent access by a victim process and an attacker process, the 
notation above is extended to include explicit modeling of 
concurrent file system object access. 
Definition 5: Safe sequence of AbsFS operations. Given a 
sequence 0 ofAbsFS operations invoked by a process/user on 
FS object f, O(f)=o 1(f),02 (f), ... , on(f), n>l, if'v',l~i~n-1, 
resolve(f) remains an invariant between o,(f) and o,+1 (f), it is 
said the sequence O(f) is a safe sequence ofAbsFS operations 
(from the concurrency point of view). Since in most cases all 
the operations in the sequence belong to the same process/ 
user, for notational simplicity, the process/user ID from the 
sequence is omitted. In case of interleaved operations, a 
superscript will be added to denote the different processes/ 
users. 
It is straightforward to see that the exclusive access by a 
single process to files is safe, i.e., the state of each FS object 
persists from the end of each AbsFS operation to the begin-
ning of the next AbsFS operation under exclusive access. 
Definition 6: Unsafe sequence of AbsFS operations: Given 
a sequence ofoperations O(f)=o 1(f),02 (f), ... , on(f), n>l, if 
3i,l~i~n-1, resolve(f) is not invariant between o,(f) and 
o,+1(f), i.e., resolve0 /f)"':esolve0 jf), O(f) is an unsafe 
sequence of AbsFS operat10ns. 
STEM Model ofTOCTTOU 
The TOCTTOU vulnerability is not due to a naively care-
less programming style. Consider the sendmail example. 
Hypothetically, the sendmail could simply open the file name 
that is the user's mailbox by naming convention (e.g., /usr/ 
mail/username) and then append emails to that file. This 
simplistic approach fails immediately because the naming 
convention may or may not hold for all names (e.g., a user 
may have created a symbolic link from /usr/mail/username to 
/etc/passwd). To avoid this kind of problems, many system 
programmers have adopted a more careful prograrmning 
style. In case of files, this careful prograrmning style estab-
lishes a predicate on the file before using it. For example, 
sendmail establishes the predicate resolve(f)=b, where b 
belongs to a regular file, not a symbolic link, before append-
ing messages to f. The predicate resolve(f)=b is an invariant 
that should remain true as long as the sendmail keeps append-
ing messages. The predicate is an invariant instead of pre-
condition, because the normal connotation of pre-condition is 
that it must be true before entering a function, but it may 
become false after the function has started. In contrast, the 
invariant must remain true through the duration of file usage. 
All system utilities of interest will establish an invariant on 
a pathname before using it. This is represented in the notation 
Definition 2: removal(pathname) is the operation that 
changes the mapping for pathname f from resolve(f)=b to 
resolve(f)=0. 
Definition 3: normal use(pathname) is the operation that 
works on an existing file system object and does not remove 
it. 
Definition 4: check(pathname) is the operation that returns 
a predicate about the named FS object. The predicate may be 
resolve(f)=b or resolve(f)=0. The file f has to be in one of 
these two states. 
55 by dividing a sequence of AbsFS operations O(f)=o1 (f), ... , 
o,(f), o,+1(f), ... , on(f) into two subsequences. The first 
subsequence o1(f), ... , o,(f) is called the "Check" part, and 
the second subsequence o,+1 (f), ... , on(f) is called the "Use" 
part. The "Check" part establishes the invariant resolve
0 
(f) 
60 and the "Use" part of the sequence relies on the invari~nt 
remaining true, i.e., O(f) is a safe sequence of AbsFS opera-
An application uses the creation operation to create a new 
FS object, the check operation to determine the invariant 
resolve(f)=b or resolve(f)=0, the normal use operation to 65 
read or write the FS object, and the removal operation to 
delete an FS object. These four kinds of operations (creation, 
tions. 
TOCTTOU Attacks in AbsFS 
Definition 7: A TOCTTOU (Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-
U se) attack on file object f consists of two concurrent pro-
US 8,127,413 B2 
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cesses, victim v and attacker a, with interleavedAbsFS opera-
tions that make v's sequence unsafe. Consider the victim v 
executing the sequence ov(f)=o1 v(f), ... 'o/(f),o,+l v(f), ... ' 
onv(f), divided into the "Check" and "Use" parts. Concurrent 
with v, attacker a is able to change the mapping resolve
0 
(f) 
established by v during the execution of the sequence ov(f), 
transforming it into an unsafe sequence. This is achieved by 
inserting the sequence 0°(f)=01 °(f),02 °(f), . . . ' ok0 (f) 
between the "Check" and "Use" parts of Ov(f). The result 
becomes: 01 v(f), ... ' o/(f), 01°(f), 02 °(f), ... ' ok0 (f),o,+l v 10 
(f) · · · , On v(f). 
To illustrate the definition with concrete scenario, a Unix-
style file system environment is used. Suppose the invariant 
established by vis resolveo (f)=b, the attack sequence 0°(f) of 
a can be: first remove f and'then create a symbolic link named 15 




0 (f)=b'. If the invariant established byv is 
resolve
0
(f)=0, a possible attack sequence 0°(f) is to create 










0 (f) and victim v continues execution withmit realizing 
the invariant created by the subsequence o/(f), ... , o/(f) (the 
"Check" part) has been violated. Consequently, the subse-
quence o,+/(f) ... , on v(f) (the "Use" part) will execute under 
the assumption of the original invariant, which is no longer 25 
true. 
6 
state are contained in the set produced by the Cartesian prod-
uct of {check, removal} x {check, creation}. The Cartesian 
product of two sets X and Y is the set of all possible ordered 
pairs whose first component is a member of X and whose 
second component is a member ofY. 
While the Cartesian product contains all the TOCTTOU 
pairs, the second term, which corresponds to the "Use" part of 
the TOCTTOU pair, can be refined. For an attacker to exploit 
a TOCTTOU vulnerability for some gain (e.g., escalation of 
privileges), the victim must be tricked into doing something 
useful for the attacker in the "Use" part. Examples of useful 
actions are: (1) set or modify the status information of an 
existing file object (e.g. make /etc/passwd world-writable); 
(2) modify the runtime environment of the victim application 
(e.g. change the current directory); and (3) release the content 
of a sensitive file object (e.g. read the content of /etc/shadow 
into memory). Since the check operation does not produce 
any useful results for the attacker, exploitable TOCTTOU 
pairs can be defined by eliminating the check operation from 
the second term ofTOCTTOU pairs. 
Now the existent state off, characterized by the invariant 
resolve(f)=b, can be analyzed. The state transition diagram in 
FIG. 1 shows that the set of operations that lead into the 
existent state is {creation, check, normal use}, and the set of 
operations that start from the existent state is {check, normal 
use, removal}. So the TOCTTOU pairs associated with this 
invariant are in the set {creation, check, normal 
The side effect of v executing the "Use" subsequence o,+1 v 
(f) ... , on v(f) after a successful TOCTTOU attack is that vis 
actually working on some other unintended file object. For 
example, if t=/etc/passwd in the sendmail example, emails 
may be appended to /etc/passwd. 
Proposition 1: Violation of an invariant is a necessary con-
dition for a successful TOCTTOU attack. 
30 use }D{ check, normal use, removal}. As a second term of the 
TOCTTOU pairs, check will not produce useful results forthe 
attacker. Consequently, check can be eliminated from the list 
of exploitable TOCTTOU pairs. 
The proposition 1 follows from Definition 7. If there is no 
violation of invariants, the sequence ov(f) is a safe sequence, 35 
so there would be no TOCTTOU attack. Consequently, 
through the entire duration ofOv(f), TOCTTOU attacks can 
be prevented by preserving the invariant established by ov(f) 
By deleting check from the second terms, the exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs are {check, removal}x{creation} for the 
first invariant and {creation, check, normal use }D{ normal 
use, removal} for the second invariant. Since there are only 
two invariants inAbsFS, all the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs and making the sequence a safe sequence. 
40 in Table 1 below have been enumerated. 
An Enumeration of TOCTTOU Pairs 
Definition 8: Consider an unsafe sequence of AbsFS opera-
tions O(f)=o1 (f),02(f), ... , on(f), where resolve0 (f),.resolve0 
1(f). The two operations surrounding theviolatio'nofthe origi': 45 
nal invariant (the last operation of the "Check" part and the 
first operation of the "Use" part), o,(f) and o,+1 (f), are called 
a TOCTTOU pair. 
It is useful to identify the TOCTTOU pairs explicitly, since 
the combinations that yield such pairs are non-trivial but 50 
manageable. The diagram in FIG. 1 shows all the AbsFS 
operations and the two states in which a file may be. On the 
left side of diagram is the non-existent state, denoted by 
resolve(f)=0 and on the right side of the diagram is the 
existent state, denoted by resolve(f)=b. 55 
It is now analyzed first the non-existent state and the invari-
ant resolve(f)=0. The first term of a TOCTTOU pair is an 
operation that results in the non-existent state off. From the 
state transition diagram in FIG. 1, it can be seen that two 
operations lead to the non-existent state: {check, removal}. 60 
The removal operation explicitly makes f non-existent, while 
the check operation also ends in the non-existent state if it 
does not find the pathname mapping. The second term of the 
TOCTTOU pair is an operation that starts from the invariant 
resolve(f)=0 (the non-existent state). The two operations that 65 
start from the non-existent state are: {check, creation}. There-
fore, the TOCTTOU pairs associated with the non-existent 
Proposition 2: The enumeration of TOCTTOU pairs in 
Table 1 is complete, i.e., it contains all the exploitable 
TOCTTOU pairs inAbsFS. 
By construction the exploitable TOCTTOU pairs in Table 
1 have been enumerated. There are only two invariants in the 
state diagram in FIG. 1, and all the state transitions in FIG. 1 
have been analyzed. 
TABLE 1 
Exploitable TOCTTOU Pairs (AbsFS) 
Invariant 
resolve(!) ~ 0 




<creation, normal use> 
<check, normal use> 
<normal use, normal use> 
<creation, removal> 
<check, removal> 
<normal use, removal> 
US 8,127,413 B2 
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TABLE2 
Enumeration of Exploitable TOCTTOU Pairs (Unix-Style File Systems) 
Invariant Exploitable TOCTTOU Pairs 
resolve(!)~ 0 (FileCheckSet x FileCreationSet) U (FileRemovalSet x FileCreationSet) U 
(DirCheckSet x DirCreationSet) U (DirRemovalSet x DirCreationSet) U 
(LinkCheckSet x LinkCreationSet) U (LinkRemovalSet x LinkCreationSet) 
resolve(!)~ b (FileCheckSet x FileNormalUseSet) U (FileCreationSet x FileNormalUseSet) U 
(LinkCreationSet x FileNormalUseSet) U (FileNormalUseSet x FileNormalUseSet)U 
(DirCheckSet x DirNormalUseSet) U (DirCreationSet x DirNormalUseSet) U 
(LinkCreationSet x DirNormalUseSet) U (DirNormalUseSet x DirNormalUseSet) 
Prevention ofTOCTTOU Attacks 
15 
Proposition 3: Blocking the creation and removal of a file 
object f across a sequence 01 (f),02 (f), ... , on(f) is 
sufficient to make the sequence safe. 
By Definition 5, a sequence of execution o1 (f),o2 (f), ... , 
on(f) is safe if'v'i, 1 ~i~n-1, resolve(f) is an invariant between 
o,(f) and o,+1(f). If any creation or removal off across o1 (f), 
This prevention will be done in two steps. First, it is main-
tained explicitly the invariant for each process/user (called the 
holder of the invariant). Second, for every file system opera-
tion that may change the invariant, it is checked whether the 
invoker of the operation is the holder of the invariant. The 
operation is allowed if it's invoked by the holder. It is disal-
lowed if it belongs to another process/user. 
20 02 (f), ... , on(f) is forbidden, creation or removal off between 
o,(f) and o,+1 (f) is also forbidden, and since creation and 
removal are the only operations that can change resolve(f), 
resolve(f) must be an invariant between o,(f) and o,+1 (f). So 
In FIG. 1, it is described the state transitions of a file with 01 (f),02 (f), ... , on(f) is guaranteed to be a safe sequence of 
execution. 
Proposition 4: Making all exploitable TOCTTOU pairs 
safe is sufficient to make all file access sequences safe 
and prevent TOCTTOU attacks. 
Proposition 3 shows the preservation of invariants through 
a file operation sequence suffices in making the sequence 
a single process/user. FIG. 2 shows the state transitions of a 
25 
file under concurrent access by multiple processes/users. 
Without loss of generality, it can be adopted the policy that the 
first process/user accessing the file object becomes the invari-
ant holder. (Intuitively, the invariant is considered as an exclu-
sive lock.) The goal of the protection mechanism is to reject 
any changes to the invariant except by the invariant holder. 
The main difference between FIG. 1 and FIG. 2 is the 
addition of three states. Two of the states (on the top part of 
FIG. 2) are due to the explicit representation of the cases of 
invariants with a holder (same as FIG.1) and without a holder 35 
(new states). These transitions are allowed, since the path-
name is free and the invariant holder is not in competition 
with any other process/user. The third new state is at the 
bottom of FIG. 2, representing a potential attack since those 
transitions would change the invariant for the holder. These 
transitions are rejected as an error. The original invariant 
holder maintains the hold on the invariant and the invariant 
remains unchanged. 
30 safe. Proposition 2 shows that all exploitable TOCTTOU 
pairs have been enumerated. Combining the two propositions 
it can be assured that making all file operation sequences safe 
(for each process/user) can prevent all TOCTTOU vulner-
abilities from being exploited. 
The above knowledge can be applied to concrete file sys-
tems. The AbsFS contains a simplified model of file system 
objects, with a very simple mapping of pathname to logical 
disk blocks, without any additional file system attributes such 
as access control. In concrete file systems, appropriate access 
40 control attributes need to be set to prevent trivial unauthorized 
file access. 
Table 1 gives a complete list ofTOCTTOU pairs inAbsFS. 
The implementation of invariant holder lock relies on a 
lock table and maps the invariant holder ID to the invariant 
across all TOCTTOU pairs. Consider a TOCTTOU pair <o1 , 
o2>. When a process u accesses a pathname fthrough o1 (f), u 
becomes the invariant holder, moving from the top states of 
FIG. 2 to one of the middle states. (Note that all four AbsFS 
operations are allowed in this step.) The protection mecha-
nism uses the lock table to remember this invariant/holder 
mapping. The lock is released when the invariant holder pro-
cess ends. These state transitions are denoted as exit(u), in 
Now the AbsFS can be mapped into Unix-style file systems. 
The first observation in the mapping is that Unix-style file 
systems have several kinds of file system objects: regular 
45 files, directories, and links. The second observation is that the 
abstract operations of check, creation, normal use, and 
removal may be implemented by several system calls. There-
fore, these abstract operations are mapped into sets of system 
calls (CreationSet, NormalUseSet, RemovalSet and Check-
50 Set) and these sets are divided into operations on each kind of 
file system objects. 
which case u releases the invariant. 55 
While the pathname f is in one of the middle states, with 
invariant holder u, another process/user (u') may attempt to 
change the invariant, which will result in "error". Other 
operations that do not affect the invariant (e.g., check and 
normal use) are allowed, as shown in FIG. 2. Thus this mecha- 60 
nism implements the assumption required in Proposition 2 to 
protect the invariants across TOCTTOU pairs. 
For practical purposes, the protection mechanism does not 
require explicit request and release of invariant-related locks. 
The management of invariant locks can be done automati- 65 
cally on behalf of applications. Furthermore, the implemen-
tation can be simplified with the following proposition. 
CreationSet=FileCreationSetUDirCreationSetULink Cre-
ationSet 




The third observation is that the removal operation in Unix-
sty le file systems does not produce any useful results for the 
attacker. This is because in Unix-style file systems, under the 
assumption of careful file attribute settings, there are only two 
ways for the attacker to make resolve(f)=resolve(t) in a 
TOCTTOU attack (t is an existing security sensitive file 
object such as /etc/passwd and f is the file object accessed by 
a TOCTTOU pair <ouo2> in the victim application): via 
symbolic link or hard link. If the attacker replaces f with a 
symbolic link tot, then the victim's removal operation on f 
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only removes f itself, but not t; If the attacker replaces f with 
a hard link tot, this will increase the number of hard links of 
t by 1, and when the victim performs the removal operation on 
f, it decreases the number of hard links oft by 1 (restores the 
original hard link number oft, but never decreases it). Since t 
is physically removed only when its hard link number 
becomes 0, given t's initial hard link number is nonzero, the 
attacker can not cause t to be removed. 
Thus for Unix-style file systems it can be eliminated those 
TOCTTOU pairs with removal as the second term from Table 10 
1. The remaining AbsFS TOCTTOU pairs can be mapped to 
Unix-style file systems as shown in Table 2. For an actual file 
system, the actual file system calls can be mapped to these sets 
to obtain the concrete TOCTTOU pairs. 
The same mapping can be done with the other flavors of 15 
Unix file systems. The POSIX mapping is shown in Table 3 
and the Linux mapping is shown in Table 4. Compare Table 4 
to Table 3 it can be seen that the sets are almost the same due 
to the fact that Linux is POSIX-compliant. Some discrepancy 
is noted though, notably the FileNormalUseSet. For example, 20 
POSIX has 6 different system calls on executing a program 
(exec!, execle, execlp, execv, execve, execvp ), but Linux only 
has one ( execve ). A closer look at the Linux implementation 
reveals that Linux implements only execve as a system call 
and uses library calls to implement the remaining 5 POSIX 25 
interfaces, which are different wrappers on top of this basic 
system call. 
TABLE3 
POSIX File Operations 
FileCreationSet = { creat, open, mknod, mkfifo, 
rename} 
DirCreationSet ~ { mkdir, rename} 
LinkCreationSet ~ {link, symlink, rename} 
FileNormalUseSet ~ { chrnod, chown, truncate, 
utime, open, fopen, fdopen, popen, execl, execle, 
execlp, execv, execve, execvp, pathconf} 
DirNormalUseSet = { chmod, chown, utime, chdir, 
pathconf} 
FileRemovalSet ~{remove, unlink, rename} 
DirRemovalSet = {remove, rmdir, rename} 
LinkRemovalSet = {remove, unlink, rename} 
FileCheckSet ~ {access, stat} 
DirCheckSet ~ {access, stat} 






Linux File Operations 
F ileCreationSet = { creat, open, mknod, rename} 
DirCreationSet ~ { mkdir, rename} 
LinkCreationSet ~ {link, symlink, rename} 
FileNormalUseSet ~ { chrnod, chown, truncate, 
utime, open, execve} 
DirNormalUseSet = { chmod, chown, utime, 
mollilt, chdir, chroot, pivot_root} 
F ileRemovalSet ~ {unlink, rename} 
DirRemovalSet ~ { rmdir, rename} 
LinkRemovalSet ~ {unlink, rename} 
F ileCheckSet ~ {stat, access} 
DirCheckSet ~ {stat, access} 
LinkCheckSet ~ {stat, access} 
Applying the mapping of Table 3 to the mapping in Table 2, 
it is identified 485 exploitable TOCTTOU pairs for POSIX. 
Similarly, by applying Table 4 to the mapping in Table 2, 224 
exploitable TOCTTOU pairs for Linux are obtained. 
Proposition 5: If the classification of a concrete file sys-
tem's operations is complete, then the enumeration of 
exploitable TOCTTOU pairs is complete for the con-
crete file system. By complete it means that the classi-
fication contains all the concrete file system calls that 
operate on file objects, and all the concrete file system 
calls are classified into check, creation, normal use, and 
removal functions on the file objects. (File system calls 
that have multiple functions appear in multiple catego-
ries.) 
Proof: The Proposition 2 guarantees the completeness of 
exploitable TOCTTOU pairs for the AbsFS. Assuming that 
the concrete file system calls have been exhaustively analyzed 
and classified, Proposition 5 follows from Proposition 2. 
By exhaustively analyzing the POSIX file system calls 
(Table 3), Proposition 5 can be applied to the enumeration of 
exploitable TOCTTOU pairs based on Table 2 and Table 3 
and it can be concluded that all the exploitable TOCTTOU 
pairs in POSIX have been enumerated. 
Some real world programs with known TOCTTOU vulner-
abilities on Unix-style systems have been studied and the 
results are shown in Table 5. For example, in sendmail, the 
TOCTTOU vulnerability is a <stat, open> pair, the invariant 
is resolve(umbox)=b, and the attack is first removing umbox 
and second creating a symbolic link under the name umbox. 
TABLES 
Some Existing TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities on Unix-style Systems 
Applications TOCTTOU pair Classification and Invariant 
BitKeeper, Cscope 15.5, <stat, open> FileCheckSet x FileCreationSet 
CUPS, getmail 4.2.0, glint, resolve(!) ~ 0 
Kerberos 4, openldap, 
OpenOffice 1.0.1, patchadd, 
procmail, samba, Xinetd 
Rational ClearCase, pppd <stat, chmod> FileCheckSet x FileNormalUseSet 
Sendmail <stat, open> resolve(!) ~ b 
logwatch 2.1.1 <stat, mkdir> DirCheckSet x DirCreationSet 
resolve(!) ~ 0 
bzip2-1.0.1, gzip, SAP <open, FileCreationSet x FileNormalUseSet 
chmod> resolve(!) ~ b 
Mac OS X 10.4 - launchd <open, 
ch own> 
StarOffice 5 .2 <mkdir, DirCreationSet x DirNormalUseSet 
chmod> resolve(!) ~ b 
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Logwatch is an open-source script for monitoring log files 
in Linux. Recently, logwatch 2.1.1 running as root was 
reported to allow a local attacker to gain elevated privileges, 
e.g., write access to /etc/passwd. This attack consists of the 
following steps: 
1. Get the running process ID {pid} oflogwatch; 
2. Create a temporary directory named /tmp/ 
logwatch. {pid}; 
3. Create a symbolic link with a specific name in the tem-
10 porary directory, which points to /etc/log.d/scripts/log-
files/samba/'cd etc; chmod 666 passwd #' 
4. Wait for logwatch to use the temporary symbolic link. 
12 
record the system call name and its arguments, particularly 
file name (full path for unique identification purposes). For 
some system calls, other related arguments are recorded to 
assist in later analysis, e.g., the mode value of chmod(path, 
mode). Some environmental variables are also recorded, 
including process ID, name of the application, user ID, group 
ID, effective user ID, and effective group ID. This informa-
tion will be used in the analysis to determine if a TOCTTOU 
pair can be exploited. 
The Sensors component also carries out a preliminary fil-
tering of their log. Specifically, they identify the system calls 
on files under the system directories listed in Table 6 and filter 
them out, since those files are immune to TOCTTOU attacks. 
After this filter, remaining potentially vulnerable system calls Although logwatch only opens it for writing, the tricky 
file name causes the shell to execute it as a command line 
later. 
15 are recorded in a circular FIFO ring buffer by printk. 
The second component ofthis framework is the Collector, 
which periodically empties the ring buffer (before it fills up). 
One implementation of the Collector is a Linux daemon that 
transforms the log records into an XML format and writes the 
The TOCTTOU pair in logwatch is <stat, mkdir>. log-
watch first checks whether the directory/tmp/logwatch. {pid} 
exists (stat) before creating it. However, an attacker may 
create that directory (as shown above) between the stat and 
mkdir system calls. In this case, logwatch's mkdir fails, but 
since logwatch does not check the status code of its mkdir, it 
continues blindly and uses the temporary directory. The 
invariant in logwatch is resolve(tmpdir)=0 and the attack is a 
creation operation (mkdir) by the attacker. (Here the tmpdir is 
/tmp/logwatch.{pid}) 
20 output to a log file for both online and offiine analysis. 
The third component of this framework is the Analyzer, 
which looks for the possible TOCTTOU pairs (decided by 
Table 2 and Table 4) that refer to the same file pathname. For 
offiine analysis, this correlation is currently done using XSLT 
25 (extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations) templates. 
This analysis proceeds in several rounds as follows. 
Round 1: First, the Analyzer sorts the log records by file 
name, grouping its operation records such as the names and 
locations (sequence numbers) of system calls. 
Round 2: Second, system calls on each file are paired to 
facilitate the matching ofTOCTTOU pairs. 
An actual TOCTTOU vulnerability consists of a victim 
program containing a TOCTTOU pair and an attacker pro-
gram trying to take advantage of the potential race condition 
introduced by the TOCTTOU pair. The attacker program 30 
attempts to access or modify the file being manipulated by the 
victim through shared access during the vulnerability win-
dow between the "Check" and "Use" steps. For example, by 
adding a line to an unintentionally shared script file in the rpm 
attack, the attacker can trick the victim into executing unin-
tended code at a higher privilege level (root). In general, a 
TOCTTOU attack is profitable if the victim is running at a 
higher level of privilege. In Unix-style OSs, this means the 
victim running as root and the attacker as normal user. 
Round 3: Third, system call pairs are compared to a list of 
previously complied TOCTTOU pairs. When a TOCTTOU 
pair is found, an XSLT template is generated to extract the 
35 corresponding log records from the original log file. 
Round 4: Fourth, the log records related to TOCTTOU 
pairs found are extracted into a new file for further inspection. 
The fourth component of this framework is the Inspector, 
which identifies the actual TOCTTOU vulnerability in the 
An important observation is that even though the victim is 
running at a higher level of privilege, the attacker must have 
sufficient privileges to operate on the shared file attributes, 
e.g., creation or deletion. This observation narrows the scope 
40 program being monitored. The Inspector links the TOCT-
TOU pair with associated environmental information, includ-
ing file pathname, related arguments, process ID, program 
name, user ID, group ID, effective user ID, and effective 
of potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities. Table 6 shows a list of 
directories owned by root in Linux. Since normal users can- 45 
not change the attributes or content of files in these directo-
ries, these files are safe. 
TABLE6 
50 
Directories Immune to TOCTTOU 
/bin /root /usr/dict /var/db 
/boot /proc /usr/kerberos /var/empty 
/dev /sbin /usr/li bexec /var/ftp 
/etc /usr/bin /usr/sbin /var/lock 
/lib /usr/etc /usr/src /var/log 55 
/misc /usr/include /usr/X11R6 /var/lib 
/mnt /usr/lib /var/cache /var/run 
/opt 
Based on the STEM model, a software framework and 60 
implemented software tools can be designed to detect actual 
TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in Linux. FIG. 3 shows the four 
components of the detection framework, based on dynamic 
monitoring of system calls made by sensitive applications 
(e.g., those that execute with root privileges). The first com- 65 
ponent of the framework is a set of plug-in Sensor code in the 
kernel, placed in system calls listed in Table 4. These Sensors 
group ID. The Inspector decides whether an actual exploita-
tion can occur. 
For each TOCTTOU pair, the Inspector does the following 
steps: 
Check the arguments of the calls to see if these calls can be 
profitable to an attacker. For example, ifthe "Use" call is 
chmod, then a value of0666 forthe mode argument falls 
into this category because this chmod can be used to 
make /etc/passwd world-writable. On the other hand, a 
mode value of 0600 is not profitable because it will not 
give the attacker any permission on a file that he/she does 
not own. In this case the TOCTTOU pair in question is 
not a TOCTTOU vulnerability. 
Check the file pathname. For the chmod example, ifthe file 
is stored under a directory writable by an ordinary user, 
like his/her home directory, then continue to the next 
step; otherwise the TOCTTOU pair is not a TOCTTOU 
vulnerability. 
Check the effective user ID. Continuing with the chmod 
example, ifthe effective user ID is 0 (root), then report 
this TOCTTOU pair as a vulnerability; otherwise, the 
TOCTTOU pair is not a vulnerability. 
It should be noted that the steps described above give only 
an outline of the Inspection process based on one attack 
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scenario for one particular TOCTTOU pair. For different 
TOCTTOU pair and different attack scenario, the details of 
these checks can be different. For example, the same TOCT-
TOU pair as the above with a mode value of 0644 and the 
same other conditions is also considered a vulnerability 
because it can be exploited to make /etc/shadow readable by 
14 
TABLES 
Potential TOCTTOU Vulnerabilities in Linux Utility Programs 
TOCTTOU 
Application errors Possible exploit 
an attacker. Thus the Inspector requires a template (or signa-
ture) for each kind of attack scenario. Table 7 shows the set of 
templates used by the current implementation of the Inspec-
tor. For brevity, this table does not show the file pathname and 10 







rpm <open, open> 
Changing the owner of /etc/passwd to an 
ordinary user 
Changing the owner of /etc/passwd to an 
ordinary user 
Making /etc/passwd writable by an 
ordinary user 
Running arbitrary command 
Gaining full access to another user's 
home directory 


























under a restricted 
directory 
Run arbitrary code 
Mislead privileged 
programs to do 
things for the 
attacker, or steal 
sensitive 
information 
Erase the content 
of/etc/passwd 
From the discussion above, the focus is on system software 
programs that use file system (outside the directories listed in 
Table 6) as a root. Each program chosen is downloaded, 
installed, configured, and deployed. Furthermore, a testing 
environment which includes the design and generation of a 
representative workload for each application it also built, plus 
the analysis ofTOCTTOU pairs observed. Although this is a 
laborious process that requires high expertise, one could 
imagine incorporating such testing environments into the 
software release of system programs, facilitating future 




The Unix "visual editor" vi is a widely used text editor in 
many UNIX-style environments. For example, Red Hat 
Linux distribution includes vi 6.1. Using the tools, it was 
found potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in vi 6.1. Specifi-
cally, if vi is run by root to edit a file owned by a normal user, 
20 then the normal user may become the owner of sensitive files 
such as /etc/passwd. 
The problem can be summarized as follows. When vi saves 
the file (f) being edited, it first renames the original file to a 
backup ( f'), then creates a new file under the original name ( f). 
25 The new file is closed after all the content in the edit buffer has 
been written to it. Because this new file is created by root (vi 
runs as root), its initial user is set to root, so vi needs to change 
its owner back to the original user (the normal user). This 
forms a <open, chown> window of vulnerability every time vi 
30 saves the file. During this window, ifthe value ofresolve(f) 
can be changed to resolve(/etc/passwd), vi can be tricked into 
changing the owner of /etc/passwd to the normal user. 
In the evaluation of the TOCTTOU vulnerability in vi, it is 
measured the percentage of time when vi is running in its 
35 vulnerability window as it saves the file being edited. In vi, 
this depends on the edited file size. In the experiments, the 
user typing time is bypassed to avoid the variations caused by 
human participation. 
It is defined a save window t as the time vi spends in 
40 processing one "save" command, and the vulnerability win-
dow v during which TOCTTOU attack may happen. It has 
been measured 60 consecutive "saves" of the file for t, and 
timestamp the open and chown system calls for v. Since the 
"save" time of a file depends on the file size, a set of experi-
45 ments on different file sizes is conducted. FIG. 5 shows the 
time required for a "save" command for files of sizes from 100 
KB to 10 MB. It was found a per file fixed cost that takes about 
14 msec forthe small (100 KB) file and an incremental cost of 
9 msec/MB (for files of size up to 10 MB). 
Since chown happens after the file is completed, the win-
dow of vulnerability v follows approximately the same incre-
mental growth of9 msec/MB (see FIG. 5). FIG. 4 shows the 
window of vulnerability to be relatively long compared to the 
total "save" time. It gradually grows to about 80% of the 
"save" total elapsed time for 10 MB files. This experiment 
tells us that vi is more vulnerable when the file being edited is 
larger. For a small file (100 KB size) the window of vulner-
ability is still about 5% of the "save" time. 
Unlike a batch program which can be easily run from a 
The tools were implemented on Red Hat 9 Linux (kernel 50 
2.4.20) to find TOCTTOU vulnerabilities in about 130 com-
monly used utility programs. The script-based experiments 
consist of about 400 lines of shell script for 70 programs in 
/bin and /sbin. This script takes about 270 seconds to gather 
approximately 310 K bytes of system call and event informa- 55 
tion. The other 60 programs were run manually using an 
interactive interface. From this sample of Linux system utili-
ties, it was found 5 potential TOCTTOU vulnerabilities (see 
Table 8). 
60 script, vi is designed for interactive use by humans. To elimi-
nate the influence of human "think time" in the experiments, 
another program is developed to interact with vi by sending it 
commands that simulate human typing. This reduces the run-
time to minimum. The experiment runs a vi (as root) editing 
The experiments were run on an Intel P4 (2.26 GHz) laptop 
with 256M memory. The Collector produces an event log at 
the rate of 650 bytes/sec when the system is idle (only back-
ground tasks such as daemons are running), 11 KB/ sec during 
the peak time a large application such as OpenOffice is 
started, and 2 KB/sec on average. The Analyzer processes the 
log at the speed of 4 KB/sec. 
65 a file owned by the attacker in the attacker's home directory. 
The editing consists of either appending or deleting a line 
from the file and the experiment ends with vi exiting. 
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The attack consists of a tight loop constantly checking (by 
stat-ing) whether the owner of the file f has become root, 
which signifies the start of the window of vulnerability. Once 
this happens, the attacker replaces f with a symbolic link to 
/etc/passwd. When vi exits, it should change the ownership of 
/etc/passwd to the attacker. FIG. 6 shows the events in a 
successful exploit of vi. The upper line shows the events of the 
vi process, and the lower line shows the events of the attacker 
process. The lighter part of the upper line corresponds to the 
vi vulnerability window. In FIG. 6, vi is suspended at some 10 
point in its vulnerability window (around 75 milliseconds) 
and the attacker process is scheduled which replaces f with a 
symbolic link to /ect/passwd. As a result, the open(f) and 
chown(f) operations of vi become an unsafe sequence of 
execution, and the attack succeeds. The attack is a removal 15 
(unlink) followed by a creation (symlink). 
Due to the non-deterministic nature of TOCTTOU, the 
attack experiment was performed for as many as 500 times to 
obtain a statistically meaningful result. Contrary to the rela-
tively wide window of vulnerability in FIG. 4, it is found a 20 
relatively low probability of success in the vi case (see FIG. 7 
and FIG. 8). This leads to a more careful analysis of the 
system events during the attack. 
Although the window of vulnerability may be wide, an 
16 
on success rates between file sizes of 2 MB and 3 MB, 
probably due to race conditions. For example, files of size 2 
MB have success rate of 4%, which is lower than the 8% 
success rate of file size 500 KB in FIG. 7. The growing 
success trend resumes after files become larger than 3 MB. 
In the experiments, it was identified 5 TOCTTOU pairs 
(see Table 8) and confirmed 3 of them through direct attacks 
(rpm, vi, and emacs). It also tried to attack gedit, the fourth 
vulnerability discovered, but it was found a very low prob-
ability of successful attack. Like vi, gedit becomes vulnerable 
when it saves the file being edited. Unlike vi, gedit writes to a 
temporary scratch file, then renames the scratch file to the 
original file name, and calls chown. Thus the window of 
vulnerability is between the rename and the directly follow-
ing chown, a very short time that reduces the probability of 
successful attack. 
The fifth vulnerability is the Enlightened Sound Daemon 
(esd), which creates a directory /tmp/.esd then changes the 
access mode ofthis directory to 777, giving full permissions 
(read/write/execute) to all users. Besides, this directory is 
under /tmp, a place where any user can create files or direc-
tories. So a possible attack is to create a symbolic link /tmp/ 
.esd before the mkdir call of esd and let the link point to some 
directories owned by the running user (such as his/her home 
attack will succeed only when: 
1. vi has called open to create the new file, 
2. vi has not called chown, 
3. vi relinquishes CPU, voluntarily or involuntarily, and the 
attacker is scheduled to run, and 
25 directory). If esd does not check whether its mkdir call suc-
ceeds, then it will change the access mode of the running 
user's home directory to 777: Then an attacker has full access 
to the running user's home directory. 
4. the attacker process finishes the file redirection during 30 
this run. 
The STEM-Model excludes careless programming, 
assuming that a precondition is established by the "Check" 
part before the "Use" part relies on it. In programs where 
preconditions are not explicitly established (a bad program-
ming practice), e.g., a program creates a temporary file under 
a known name without first stat-ing the existence of the file, 
The first two conditions have been studied in the baseline 
experiment. The fourth condition depends on the implemen-
tation of the attacker program. For example, if the attacker 
program is written in C instead of shell script, it will be less 
likely to be interrupted. 
35 exploits may happen outside the STEM model. 
Tool-based detection of vulnerabilities typically does not 
achieve 100% precision. The framework described above is 
no exception. There are some technical sources of false posi-
tives: 
The third condition is the least predictable. In the experi-
ments, it was found several reasons for vi to relinquish CPU. 
First, vi may suspend itself to wait for I/O. This is likely since 
the window of vulnerability includes the writing of the con-
tent of the file, which may result in disk operations. Second, 
vi may use up its CPU slice. Third, vi may be preempted by 
higher priority processes such as ntpd, kswapd, and bdflush 
kernel threads. Even after vi relinquishes CPU, the second 
part of the condition (that the attacker process is scheduled to 
run) still depends on other processes not being ready to run. 
40 1. Incomplete knowledge of search space: The list of immune 
directories (Table 6) is not complete because of the 
dynamic changes to system state (e.g. newly created root-
owned directories under /usr/local), which leads to false 
positives. 
45 2. Artifacts oftest environment: If the test cases themselves 
This analysis illustrates the highly non-deterministic 
nature of a TOCTTOU attack. To achieve a statistically mean-
ingful evaluation, the experiments were repeated and the 
probability of attack success was computed. To make the 50 
experimental results reproducible, it was eliminated all the 
confounding factors that were identified. For example, in 
each round of experiments, vi was executed at least 50 times, 
each time on a different file, to minimize file caching effects. 
It is also observed memory allocation problems after large 55 
files have been used. To relieve memory pressure, it is added 
a 2-second delay between successive vi invocations. 
FIG. 7 shows the success rate for file sizes ranging from 
100 KB to 1 MB averaged over 500 rounds. It is observed that 
for small files, there is a rough correlation between the size of 60 
window of vulnerability and success rate. Although not 
strictly linear, the larger the file being edited, the larger is the 
probability of successfully attacking vi. 
FIG. 8 shows the results for file sizes ranging from 2 MB to 
4 MB, with a stepping size of 20 KB, averaged over 100 65 
rounds. Unlike the dominantly increasing success rate for 
small file sizes, it was found apparently random fluctuations 
uses /tmp or the home directory of an ordinary user, the 
tools have to report related TOCTTOU pairs, which are 
false positives. For example, the initial test case for cpio 
uses a temporary directory /tmp/cpio, so the tools reported 
a <stat, chdir> on this directory. 
3. Coincidental events: Because the tools do system-wide 
monitoring, they capture file system calls made by every 
process. Sometimes two unrelated processes happen to 
make system calls on the same file that appear to be a 
TOCTTOU pair. 
4. Incomplete knowledge of application domain: Not every 
TOCTTOU pair is profitably exploitable. For example, the 
application rpm invoked by "--addsign" option contains a 
<stat, open> pair, which can open any file in the system for 
reading, such as /etc/shadow. However, rpm can not pro-
cess /etc/shadow because it is not in the format recogniz-
able by rpm. So it is unlikely that this pair can be exploited 
to undermine a system. 
By improving the kernel filter (source 1 ), re-designing test 
cases (source 2), and reducing concurrent activities (source 
3), the false positive of the tools is reduced; for example, in 
one experiment testing 33 Linux programs under /bin, the 
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false positive rate fell from 7 5% to 27%. However, source 4 is 
hard to remove due to the differences among application 
domains. 
Based on the discussion above, an event driven approach, 
called EDGI (Event Driven Guarding oflnvariants ), to defend 
applications against TOCTTOU attacks can be introduced. 
The design requirements of EDGI are: 
18 
object). The conditions refer to the file object status (whether 
the invariant is resolve(f)=0 or resolve(f)=b ), and actions 
include the creation, removal and potentially more complex 
invariant maintenance actions. 
EDGI prevents TOCTTOU attacks by making the 
sequence of system calls on a file object safe. As suggested by 
Proposition 3, the invariant maintenance rules in Table 9 are 
not restricted to a TOCTTOU pair, but extend to a sequence of 
file system calls. During the time such a sequence of accesses 
1. It should solve the problem within the file system, and 
does not change the API, so that existing or future appli-
cations need not be modified. 
2. It should solve the problem completely, i.e., no false 
negatives. 
10 exists, the file object is said to be actively used. Otherwise the 
file object is said to be free. 
3. It should not add undue burden on the system, i.e., very 
low rate of false positives. 
The interval during which the file object is actively used 
forms the scope of its invariant. The scope varies in length, 
depending on the number of consecutive "Use" calls made by 
4. It should incur very low overhead on the system. 
EDGI consists of three design steps, a concrete implemen-
tation, and an experimental evaluation. The first design step is 
15 the application. Consequently, a significant technical chal-
lenge is to correctly identify this scope-the boundaries of 
the TOCTTOU vulnerability window of the application. 
Since current Unix-style file systems are oblivious to such to map the STEM model into invariants in a concrete file 
system and the kernel calls that preserve the invariants. The 
second design step uses ECA (event-condition-action) rules 20 
to model the concrete invariant preservation methods, so 
there is reasonable assurance the invariants are indeed pre-
served. The third design step completes the design by 
addressing the remaining issues such as the automated infer-
ence of invariant scope and inheritance of invariants by chi!- 25 
dren processes. 
Under the STEM model's assumption, the "Check" part of 
a sequence of operations on a file object creates an invariant 
that should be preserved through to the corresponding "Use" 
part. Specifically, a file certified to be non-existent (resolve 30 
( f)=0) by the "Check" operations should remain non-existent 
until the "Use" operations create it. Similarly, a file certified 
to be existent (resolve(f)=b) by the "Check" operations 
should remain the same file until the "Use" part (by the same 
user) accesses it. Identifying and preserving these two invari- 35 
ants (resolve(f)=0 or resolve(f)=b) are the main goals of 
EDGI approach. 
The EDGI design treats an invariant as a sophisticated lock. 
The user invoking a "Check" call becomes the owner of the 
lock, and the lock is usually held by the same user through the 40 
"Use" call. Due to the complications of Unix file system, the 
invariant handling is more complicated than a normal lock 
compatibility table. 
application-level semantics, the scope needs to be inferred, so 
no changes are imposed on the applications or the file system 
interfaces. 
The inference of invariant scope is guided by the STEM 
model, which specifies the initial TOCTTOU pair explicitly. 
The "Use" call of the initial pair becomes the "Check" call of 
the next pair, completed by the following "Use" call. Accord-
ing to Proposition 2, the STEM model correctly captures the 
TOCTTOU problem. The invariant of the initial pair is main-
tained from the "Check" call through the "Use" call, and then 
to the additional "Use" calls. The sequence continues until the 
program ends, a time-out or preemption occurs. In summary, 
the scope of an invariant is a safe sequence of system calls 
(Definition 5). 
There are some additional issues that need to be resolved 
for an implementation. First, ifthe invariants is considered as 
similar to locks, then the question of dead-lock and live-lock 
arises. For example, it is possible that an invariant holder is a 
long-running process which only touches a file object at the 
very beginning and then never uses it again. Consequently, a 
legitimate user may be prevented from creating/deleting the 
file object for a long time, resulting in denial of service. This 
problem can be addressed by a time out mechanism. If an 
invariant holder process does not access a file object for an 
exceedingly long time, the invariant will be temporarily dis-
abled to allow other legitimate users to proceed. 
If the time-out results in simple preemption (i.e., breaking 
the lock), then this method may be used to attack very long 
application runs. To prevent the preemption-related attack, it 
is use a tainted bit to mark the preemption. After a preemp-
tion-related file creation or deletion, the invariant no longer 
The EDGI approach adopts a modular design and imple-
mentation strategy by separating the EDGI invariant process- 45 
ing from the existing kernel. The invariant-related informa-
tion is maintained as extra state information for each file 
object. When an invariant-related event is triggered, the cor-
responding set of conditions is evaluated and if necessary, 
appropriate actions are taken to maintain the invariant. 50 holds. EDGI marks the file object as tainted, so the next 
access request from the original invariant holder will be 
aborted. 
The invariant-related information for each file object 
includes its state (free or actively used), a tainted flag, invari-
ant holder user ID and a process list. In detail: 
refcnt-the number of active processes using the file 
object. When refcnt=O, the file object is free. 
tainted-when refcnt>O, this flag means whether the name 
to disk object binding can be trusted. 
fsuid-the user ID of the processes that are actively using 
the file object. 
The second and related issue is the relationship between 
the current invariant holder and the next process attempting to 
55 access the file object. Up to now, it has been assumed a 
symmetric relationship, without distinguishing legitimate 
users from attackers. In reality, some processes are more 
trustworthy than others. Specifically, in Unix environments 
gh_list-a doubly-linked list, in which each node contains 60 
a process ID and the timestamp of the last system call 
made by the process on the file object. 
the file object owner and root processes can be trusted com-
pletely. Consequently, these processes are allowed to "break 
the lock" by preempting other invariant holders. Concretely, 
when the file object owner or root process attempt to access a 
file object, they immediately become the invariant holder, and 
the invariant for the former holder is removed. 
Two kinds of events trigger condition evaluation: 
File system calls such as access, open, rnkdir, etc. 
Process operations: fork, execve, exit. 
The conditions evaluated by each event and their associ-
ated actions are summarized in Table 9 (f denotes the file 
65 The third issue is the inheritance of invariants by children 
processes. For example, after a user process checks on a file 
object and becomes an invariant holder, it spawns a child 
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process, and terminates. In the mean time, the child process 
continues, and uses the file object. In the simple solution, the 
invariant is removed when the owner (parent) process termi-
nates. In this case an attacker can achieve a TOCTTOU attack 
before the child process uses the file. Thus the scope of 
invariants must extend to the child process at every process 
creation. 
that keeps track of the processes that are actively using each 
file object. The index to this hash table is the file pathname, 
and for each entry, a list of process ids is maintained. The 
modular implementation augments the existing directory 
entry ( dentry) cache code and extends its data structures with 
the fields: fsuid, refcnt, tainted, gh_list. 
Before a system call uses a file object by name, it first needs 
to resolve the pathname to a dentry. The implementation 
instruments the Linux kernel to call the invariant holder track-
ing algorithm after each such pathname resolution. There are 
two possible approaches to implementing this algorithm. The 
first is to instrument the body of every system call (e.g., 
A final issue is whether the EDGI approach is a complete 
solution, capable of stopping all TOCTTOU attacks. For 
every file system call, the rules summarized in Table 9 are 10 
checked and followed. The first time a "Check" call is 
invoked on a file object, that user becomes the file object's 
invariant holder. At any given time there is at most one invari-
ant holder for each file object. Users other than the invariant 
holder are not allowed to create or remove the file object 
(including changes to mapping between the name and disk 
objects). Therefore, the EDGI defense is able to stop all 
TOCTTOU attacks identified by the STEM model. 
sys_open) that uses a file pathname as argument. The second 
is to instrument the pathname resolution functions them-
15 selves (in the Linux case, link_path_walk and lookup_hash). 
The first approach has the disadvantage that instrumented 
code has to spread over many places, making testing and 
maintenance difficult. The second approach has the advan-
TABLE9 
Invariant Maintenance Rules in EDGI 
Narue Event Condition Action 
Incarnation Any refcnt ~~ 0 Set f's state as actively used (refcnt++); set 
rule system its tainted flag as false, fsuid as current user 
call on f ID, record current pid and current system 
time in the gh_list. 
Reinforcement Any refcnt > 0 and Record current pid and current system time 
rule system fsuid == current in the gh_ list. 
call on f user ID and 
tainted ~~ false 
Abort rule Any refcnt > 0 and Record current pid and current system time 
system fsuid == current in the gh_ list. Return an error. 
call on f user ID and 
tainted ~~ true 
Root Any refcnt > 0 and Remove all invariant holders information 
preemption system fsuid != current from the gh_list; set f's fsuid as current user 
rule call on f user ID and ID, set refcnt as 1, tainted as false, record 
current user ID current pid and current system time in the 
==root gh_ list. 
Owner Any refcnt > 0 and Remove all invariant holders information 
preemption system fsuid != current from the gh_list; set f's fsuid as current user 
rule call on f user ID and ID, set refcnt as 1, tainted as false, record 
current user ID current pid and current system time in the 
!=root and gh_ list. 
fsuid !~root and 
current user is 
the owner off 
Invariant Any refcnt > 0 and Traverse the gh_list to get the latest 
maintenance system fsuid != current timestamp t, compute the interval between t 
rule 1 call in the user id and current time, if it is less than threshold 
Removal MAX_AGE, deny the current request, 
Set on f otherwise grant the current request and set 
tainted as true. 
Invariant Any refcnt > 0 and Traverse the gh_list to get the latest 
maintenance system fsuid != current timestamp t, compute the interval between t 
rule 2 call in the user id and current time, if it is less than threshold 
Creation MAX_AGE, deny the current request, 
Set on f otherwise grant the current request and set 
tainted as true. 
Clone rule fork True For each file object that has parent in its 
(parent, gh_list, record child and current system 
child) time, and increment the refcnt. 
Termination Exit True Remove current pid from the gh_list of each 
rule file object that has it on its gh_list, and 
decrement the corresponding refcnt. 
Distract rule Execve True Remove current pid from the gh_list of each 
file object that has it on its gh_list, and 
decrement the corresponding refcnt. 
The implementation of the design described above consists tage that only a few (in the Linux case, exactly two) places 
need to be instrumented, making the testing and maintenance 
relatively easy. The second approach is adopted for the imple-
mentation. 
of modular kernel modifications to maintain the invariants for 65 
every file object and its user/owner. Invariant holder tracking 
is accomplished by maintaining a hash table of pathnames 
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The invariant holder tracking algorithm GH is shown in 
FIG. 9. This algorithm effectively implements the rules sum-
marized in Table 9, and it is called right before link_path_ 
walk and lookup_hash successfully returns. Line 1-2 of the 
invariant holder tracking algorithm addresses the situation 
where a new invariant holder is identified: invariant related 
data structure is initialized, including the invariant holder user 
ID (fsuid), the invariant holder process ID, the tainted flag, 
and a timestamp. After these steps, the invariant maintenance 
part will start applying this invariant. It can be seen that the 10 
same sequence also occurs in Line 8 and 12, where a new 
invariant holder is decided due to preemption. Line 3-6 
address the situation where an existing invariant holder 
accesses the file object again. Notice that the tainted flag is 15 
checked to abort the invariant holder process if the name to 
disk binding of the file object has been changed by another 
user's process. Line 8 corresponds to the preemption of 
invariant from a normal user to the root. Similarly, line 12 
handles the preemption by file object owner. 20 
The invariant holder tracking algorithm needs the current 
process ID and current user ID runtime information, which 
are obtained from the current global data structure maintained 
by the Linux kernel. 
The second part of implementation is invariant mainte- 25 
nance by thwarting the attacker's attempt to change the name 
to disk binding of a file object, which in tum is achieved by 
deleting or creating a file object. Two kernel functions are 
instrumented to perform invariant checks: 
may_delete(d): this function is called to do permission 30 
check before deleting a file object d. It is added an 
invariant checking after all the existing checks have been 
passed: If d.refcnt>O and the current user ID is not the 
same as d.fsuid, traverse d.gh_list to get the last access 
timestamp; if it is younger than MAX_AGE, return- 35 
EBUSY (file object in use and cannot be deleted). Oth-





















The EDGI system design follows the STEM model, and the 
completeness STEM is given in Proposition 5. If the ECA 
rules summarized in Table 9 captures all the TOCTTOU pairs 
identified by the STEM model, and the invariant holder track-
ing algorithm in FIG. 9 implements all the rules in Table 9, 
and the Linux kernel implementation is correct, then the 
implementation should have zero false negatives. 
One exception to the invariant maintenance rules is the 
preemption by programs running as root, which are allowed 
to gain the invariant and change file object status at will. This 
exception is safe, since ifan attacker has already obtained root 
privileges, there is no further gain for using TOCTTOU 
attacks. 
As discussed above, the maintenance of invariants may 
introduce long delays, if an invariant holder runs for a long 
time. These long delays can be considered a kind of false 
positives, since they may or may not be necessary. The exem-
plary implementation introduces a time-out mechanism to 
mitigate this problem. If another user's process wants to 
create/delete the file object and encounters the last access 
time by the invariant holder to be older than the time-out 
period, the new process is allowed to preempt the invariant 
and the file object is marked as tainted. If the original invariant 
holder attempts to use the file object again, then a real conflict 
is found. The exemplary implementation aborts the original 
invariant holder, although other design choices are possible. 
The determination of a suitable time-out period, called 
may_create(d): this function is called to do permission 
check before creating a file object, similar invariant 
checking is added after all the existing checks have been 
passed. 
The may _create kernel function is called by all the system 
calls in the CreationSet and the may _delete function is called 
by all the system calls in the corresponding RemovalSet. 
These invariant checks implement the Invariant Maintenance 
Rules 1and2 in Table 9. 
40 MAX_AGE in Table 9, is probably dependent on each spe-
cific workload and a research question. If it is too short, an 
attacker may use it to abort a long running legitimate process 
by attempting to write to a shared file. If it is too long, another 
legitimate process may be delayed for a long time. A MAX_ 
45 AGE of 60 seconds is set for the exemplary implementation. 
A variant of the Andrew benchmark is used to evaluate the 
overhead introduced by EDGI defense mechanism. The 
benchmark consists of five stages. First, it uses mkdir to 
recursively create 110 directories. Second it copies 744 files 
Table 10 shows the size ofEDGI implementation in Linux 
kernel 2.4.28. The changes were concentrated in one file 
(dcache.c), which was changed by about 55%. The other 
changes were small, with less than 5% change in one other file 
(namei.c), plus single-line changes in three other files. This 
implementation of less than 1000 lines of code (LOC) was 
achieved after careful control and data flow analysis of the 
kernel, plus some tracing. 
50 with a total size of 12 MB. Third, it stats 1715 files and 
directories. Fourth, it greps (scan through) these files and 
directories, reading a total amount of 26 M bytes. Fifth, it 
does a compilation of around 150 source files. For every 
From a top-down point of view, the methodical design and 55 
implementation process benefited from the STEM model as a 
starting point. Then, the ECA rules facilitated the reasoning 
of invariant maintenance. The rules were translated into the 
Invariant Holder Tracking algorithm. 
stage, the total running time is calculated and recorded. 
The exemplary implementation was run on a Pentium III 
800 MHz laptop with 640 MB memory, running Red Hat 
Linux in single user mode. It is reported the average and 
standard deviation of 20 runs for each experiment in Table 11 
which compares the measurements on the original Linux 
60 kernel and on the EDGI-augmented Linux kernel. The same 
data is shown as bar chart in FIG. 10. 
Conversely, from a bottom-up point of view, the Linux 
kernel was organized in a methodical way. For example, it has 
exactly two functions (may_delete and may_create) control-
ling all file object status changes. By guarding these two 
functions, it is possible to guard all 224 TOCTTOU pairs 
identified by the STEM model. This kind of function factor- 65 
ing in the Linux kernel contributed to the modular implemen-
tation ofEDGI. 
The Andrew benchmark results show that EDG I generally 
has a moderate overhead. The only exception is stat, which 
has 4 7% overhead. The explanation is that stat takes less time 
than other calls (such as mkdir), but the extra processing due 
to invariant holder tracking (now part of pathname resolution) 
has a constant factor across different calls. This constant 
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overhead weighs more in short system calls such as stat. 
Fortunately, stat is used relatively rarely, thus the overall 
impact remains small. 
TABLE 11 
Andrew Benchmark Results (in milliseconds) 
Functions Original Linux Modified Linux Overhead 
mkdir 6.35 ± 0.21 6.43 ± 0.19 1.3% 
copy 217.0±1.5 218.6 ± 1.4 0.7% 
stat 132.0 ± 1.9 193.6 ± 0.8 47% 
grep 777.0 ± 4.3 870.1 ± 5.3 12% 
compile 53,971±434 55,615 ± 367 3.0% 
PostMark benchmark is designed to create a large pool of 
continually changing files and to measure the transaction 
rates for a workload approximating a large Internet electronic 
mail server. PostMark first tests the speed of creating new 
files, and then it tests the speed of transactions. Each transac-
tion has a pair of smaller transactions, which are either read/ 
append or create/delete. 
On the original Linux kernel the running time of this 
benchmark is 40.0 seconds. On EDGI-augmented kernel, 
with all the same parameter settings, the running time is 40.1 
seconds (Again these results are averaged over 20 rounds). So 
the overhead is 0.25%. This result corroborates the moderate 
overhead ofEDGI. 
Based on the above discussion, it is shown that the present 
invention can be implemented in an operating system and 
reduce the vulnerability of the operating system. The method 
and system disclosed above allows the operating system to 
classify system function calls according to predefined classes 
and generate a full set of pairs of function calls according to 
a predefined criterion. This full set of function call pairs will 
include potential combinations of function calls between the 
predefined classes and two function calls within one pair are 
associated with one single file invariant. For example, FIG.11 
illustrates a flow chart 1100 for creating and classifying func-
tion calls in an operating system. A system function calls in a 
system library can be classified into different classes accord-
ing to whether the function call creates a file, creates a direc-
tory, creates a link, etc., step 1102. The function call will 
create or otherwise associate to a file invariant when it is 
invoked by a process. A function call will be paired with 
another function call that associates to the same file invariant. 
After classifying the function calls, function calls can be 
paired according to predefined criteria, step 1104, and the 




operating system will check the identity of the user or process 
invoking the function call, step 1212. If the user or process 
identity associated with the function call is the same as the 
user or process identity associated with the file invariant, step 
1214, then the operating system checks whether a "tainted" 
flag is set, step 1236. The tainted flag may be set if the file 
invariant has been accessed by another process as explained 
below. If the tainted flag is set, an alert is set, step 1222, and 
the function will not be invoked. If the tainted flag is not set, 
then the operating system will check if the function call is part 
of a sequence of function calls, step 1224. A sequence of 
function calls involves multiple function calls that concern a 
single file invariant. For example, (open, chown, chmod) is a 
triple function calls used to change the ownership and mode 
15 of a file. First the file is open, then the ownership is changed, 
and finally the mode is changed. These three operations are 
done consecutively. The sequence of function calls is not 
limited to three consecutive function calls; it may involve an 
arbitrary number of functions. If the function call is not part of 
20 a sequence of function calls, then the file invariant is removed, 
step 1226, the associated timer is also stopped, step 1234, and 
the function call is invoked, step 1210. If the function call is 
part of a long sequence of function calls, such as (open, 
chown, chmod, truncate, execve ), then the timer is reset, step 
25 1228, the function call is invoked, step 1210, and the file 
invariant is not removed. If the user identity of the function is 
not the same as the user identity of the file invariant, the 
operating system checks if the user identity is root, step 1216. 
If the function call is invoked by root, the operating system 
30 changes the identity associated with the file invariant to root, 
step 1218, resets the timer, step 1220, and the function call is 
invoked, step 1210. If the user identity is not root, this means 
that either the computer system may be under attack or the 
timer may have expired and the file invariant not removed. 
35 The timer is then checked, step 1230. If the timer has expired, 
the operating system will allow the access of the file invariant, 
but the operating system will record the access by setting up 
a "tainted" flag, step 1232, to indicate the access of the file 
invariant by another user. If the timer has not expired, then 
40 operating system rejects the function call and an alert is set, 
step 1222. Because the function call is refused, the attack is 
prevented and the system is never endangered. 
There is a possibility that a function call may be part of a 
long sequence of function calls and the file invariant may be 
45 needed to prevent the system vulnerability through all the 
function calls in this long sequence of function calls. One way 
to ensure that a file invariant is properly cleaned up and the 
system resource properly released is through use of the timer. 
The timer is started when a file invariant is created and the 
50 timer is removed or stopped when the file invariant is deleted 
or otherwise removed. The timer is reset each time an autho-
rized function call that concerns the same file invariant is 
invoked, so the file invariant is properly protected. The file 
FIG. 12 illustrates a flow chart for an operating system 
running on a computer system. When a function call is 
invoked, step 1202, the operating system checks ifthe func-
tion call is one of the paired function calls, step 1204. If it is 
not, then the function call is invoked normally, step 1210. If 55 
the function call is one of the paired function calls, then the 
operating system checks if a file invariant has been created, 
step 1206. If the file invariant has not been created, then the 
operating system creates the file invariant, step 1208, starts a 
timer associated with this file invariant, step 1209, and 60 
invokes the function call, step 1210. The timer helps to solve 
the problem created by a long running process as stated above 
and further discussed below. The file invariant will be asso-
ciated with the process or the user who invoked the function 
call, and the operating system will record the file invariant. If 
the file invariant has been created, which means that the 
function is the second function of a paired function calls, the 
invariant can be disabled by a function call invoked by a 
different user after the timer has expired since the file invari-
ant was last accessed. A file invariant may also be removed 
when the process to which it is associated is terminated. Table 
9 above discloses many more rules on the maintenance of file 
invariants. 
While the invention has been particularly shown and 
described with reference to a preferred embodiment thereof, 
it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various 
changes in form and detail may be made without departing 
from the spirit and scope of the present invention as set forth 
65 in the following claims. For example, the description above is 
for Unix-based operating system, it is understood the appa-
ratus, system, and method can be easily modified to support 
US 8,127,413 B2 
25 
other operating systems. Furthermore, although elements of 
the invention may be described or claimed in the singular, the 
plural is contemplated unless limitation to the singular is 
explicitly stated. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method for reducing vulnerability in a computer sys-
tem, the computer system having a generation unit, a timer 
and memory, by identifying vulnerable pairs of function calls, 
10 
comprising the steps of: 
generating, by the generation unit, a plurality of pairs of the 
function calls according to a predefined criteria; 
invoking a first function call from a pair of the function 
calls by a first user; 15 
creating a file invariant associated with the pair of the 
function calls, the file invariant having a tainted flag; 
starting the timer; 
associating the timer with the file invariant; 
if a second function call is from the pair of the function 20 
calls and is invoked by a second user and the timer has 
not expired, denying the second function call to the 
second user; 
ifthe second function call is from the pair of the function 
calls and is invoked by the second user and the timer has 25 
expired, setting the tainted flag for the file invariant and 
allowing the second function call by the second user; 
ifthe second function call is from the pair of the function 
calls and is invoked by the first user and the tainted flag 
for the file invariant is set, denying the second function 30 
call to the first user; and 
ifthe second function call is from the pair of the function 
calls and is invoked by the first user and the tainted flag 
for the file invariant is not set, allowing the second func-
tion call to the first user, removing the file invariant, and 35 
stopping the timer. 
2. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of 
indicating an alert if the tainted flag for the file invariant is set. 
3. The method of claim 1 further comprising the step of 
setting a flag in the file invariant if the information from the 40 
second functional call is different from the file invariant. 
26 
12. A system for reducing vulnerability in a computer 
system by identifying vulnerable pairs of function calls, com-
prising: 
a classifying unit for classifying the function calls into a 
plurality of predefined classes; and 
a generation unit for generating a plurality of pairs of the 
function calls according to a predefined criteria; 
wherein 
a file invariant is created by the computer system and 
associated with a pair of the function calls generated 
by the generation unit when a first function call from 
the pair of the function calls is invoked by a first user, 
the file invariant includes a tainted flag, the tainted 
flag is set when the pair of function calls being 
invoked by two different processes, the file invariant is 
associated with a timer and the timer is set when the 
first function call from the pair of the function calls is 
invoked by a first user, 
if the timer is expired and a second function call in the 
pair of the function calls is invoked by a second user, 
allowing the second function call by the second user 
and setting the tainted flag, and 
ifthe second function call in the pair of the function calls 
is invoked by the first user and the tainted flag is not 
set, allowing the second function call by the first user, 
removing the file invariant, and stopping the timer. 
13. The system of claim 12, further comprising a file invari-
ant creation unit for creating the file invariant. 
14. The system of claim 13, further comprising a file invari-
ant checking unit for checking information created when the 
second function call is invoked against the first file invariant. 
15. The system of claim 12, wherein the generation unit 
further being capable of pairing a function call from a first 
predefined class with a function call from a second predefined 
class. 
16. The system of claim 12, wherein the file invariant being 
a link between a file name and a file storage location. 
17. The system of claim 12, wherein the file invariant being 
a file ownership information. 
18. The system of claim 12, wherein the plurality of pre-
defined classes include creation, removal, check, and normal 
use. 4. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of generating a 
plurality of pairs further comprising the step of pairing a 
function call from a first predefined class with a function call 
from a second predefined class. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein the file invariant being 
a link between a file name and a file storage location. 
19. The system of claim 12, wherein, if the second function 
call is part of a sequence of at least three function calls and is 
45 invoked by the first user and the tainted flag for the file 
invariant is not set, resetting the timer and allowing the second 
function call to the first user. 
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the file invariant being 
a file ownership information. 
7. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of 50 
classifying the function calls into to a plurality of predefined 
classes, wherein the plurality of predefined classes include 
creation, removal, check, and normal use. 
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality of pairs 
being a full list of potential combination of pairs of function 55 
calls that conform to the predefined criteria. 
9. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of disabling the 
file invariant further comprising the step of setting the tainted 
flag. 
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of 60 
disabling the file invariant further comprising the step of 
setting the tainted flag. 
11. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of, 
if the second function call is part ofa sequence ofat least three 
function calls and is invoked by the first user and the tainted 65 
flag for the file invariant is not set, resetting the timer and 
allowing the second function call to the first user. 
20. A computer readable storage device having computer 
readable code, which when executed by a computer imple-
ments an operating system for a computer system with 
reduced vulnerability, the operating system comprising: 
a library of plurality of function calls; 
a classifying unit, the classifying unit classifies the func-
tion calls into a plurality of predefined classes; and 
a generation unit, the generation unit generates a plurality 
of pairs of the function calls according to a predefined 
criteria, 
wherein 
each pairof the function calls being associated with a file 
invariant when a first function call from the pair of the 
function calls is invoked by a first user, the file invari-
ant includes a tainted flag, the tainted flag is set when 
a pair of function calls being invoked by different 
processes, the file invariant is associated with a timer 
and the timer is set when the first function call from 
the pair of the function calls is invoked by the first 
user, 
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if the timer is expired and a second function call in the 
pair of the function calls is invoked by a second user, 
allowing the second function call by the second user 
and setting the tainted flag, and 
ifthe second function call in the pairofthe function calls 
is invoked by the first user and the tainted flag is not 
set, allowing the second function call by the first user, 
removing the file invariant, and stopping the timer. 
21. The operating system of claim 20, further comprising a 
file invariant creation unit for creating a file invariant when 10 
the first function call within a pair of the function calls is 
invoked. 
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24. The operating system of claim 20, wherein the file 
invariant being a link between a file name and a file storage 
location. 
25. The operating system of claim 20, wherein the file 
invariant being a file ownership information. 
26. The operating system of claim 20, wherein the plurality 
of predefined classes include creation, removal, check, and 
normal use. 
27. The operating system of claim 20, wherein, ifthe sec-
ond function call is part of a sequence of at least three function 
calls and is invoked by the first user and the tainted flag forthe 
file invariant is not set, resetting the timer and allowing the 
22. The operating system of claim 21, further comprising a 
file invariant checking unit for checking information created 
when the second function call is invoked against the first file 
invariant. 15 second function call to the first user. 
23. The operating system of claim 20, wherein the genera-
tion unit further being capable of pairing a function call from 
a first predefined class with a function call from a second 
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